An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement from the Definition of Forcible Rape by Schwartz, Susan
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1983
An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance
Requirement from the Definition of Forcible Rape
Susan Schwartz
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement from the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
567 (1983).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol16/iss3/2
AN ARGUMENT FOR THE ELIMINATION OF
THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT FROM
THE DEFINITION OF FORCIBLE RAPE
by Susan Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rape laws have traditionally required the victim's resistance as an
element of the crime. This article addresses the resistance requirement
and argues for its elimination. Further, it traces the requirement from
its early embodiment in the common law, through its codification in
many states and statutes in the Model Penal Code.
This article also evaluates two recent statutory enactments which
are designed to shift the focus from whether or not a victim has resisted
her assailant to whether or not she has consented to the act of inter-
course. Michigan's "criminal circumstances" approach and Califor-
nia's "robbery model" definitions of rape will be examined. The focal
point of the article is that these approaches will not eliminate the resist-
ance requirement from the law of rape. A model statute which will
eliminate the resistance requirement from the law of rape is proposed.
II. THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT IN RAPE
A rape statute must, in its essence, define those situations in which
an act of intercourse is a criminal act: A common formulation is that
the act is criminal1 if it is "against the will of the victim."2 In a statu-
tory enactment, a problem arises in defining those acts which are
against the victim's will.3
Traditionally, a woman has been required to demonstrate resist-
ance to her assailant in order to establish that she did not consent to a
* B.A. cum laude 1977, City University of New York; J.D. 1981, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles; Associate Haynes & Hume; Member, California Bar.
1. This article will argue that only those acts of intercourse which occur without the
consent of one of the parties should be treated as criminal acts under a forcible rape statute.
2. Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 206, 106 N.W. 536 (1906). See People v. Dohring, 59
N.Y. 374 (1874).
3. See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Court-
room, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32-39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulation].
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sexual encounter;4 bruises and broken bones can provide objective evi-
dence of nonconsent when a woman's motive in reporting a rape is
considered suspect.5 The resistance requirement originated in the com-
mon law.6 While one recent statutory revision has eliminated the re-
quirement that a rape victim resist her assailant,7 many rape statutes
still explicitly require victim resistance.8 Other statutes which appear
on their face not to require resistance have been interpreted by the
courts to require victim resistance.9
A. The Common Law
The common law defined rape as the carnal knowledge of a wo-
man, "by force" and "against her will."' 10 While this language does not
explicitly require resistance, courts have universally interpreted this
language as requiring that a victim resist her assailant. I The required
degree of resistance has changed somewhat through the years.' 2 Older
4. See Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. Ci. L. REV.
613, 626 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Towards a Consent Standard].
A third premise of traditional rape law is that unchaste women are untruthful
in general and often bring false charges of rape. Wigmore, who believed that un-
chaste women are pathological liars, proposed that no judge let a sex offense go to
the jury unless the complainant's social history and mental makeup had been ex-
amined and testified to by a physician. Though modem courts do not take so dis-
trustful an approach, they nonetheless instruct juries that unchastity has a bearing
on credibility, at least where consent to an alleged rape is at issue. It is still com-
monly supposed that a woman who has engaged in illicit sexual intercourse will
bring a false rape charge for reasons of guilt, revenge or self-protection. In light of
the time, trauma and humiliation involved in a rape trial, common sense alone
would cast doubt on the validity of these suppositions. Empirical data supports
this hypothesis, demonstrating that only a minute percentage of rape reports made
to police are in fact false.
Id at 626.
5. "Distrust of the complainant's credibility has led to an exaggerated insistence on
evidence of resistance." Id. at 626.
6. See infra note 18.
7. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (Supp. 1979). New Mexico's statute specifies
that resistance is not required.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1980).
9. Those statutes which follow the common law approach have uniformly been inter-
preted as requiring resistance. Furthermore, those statutes which follow the "criminal cir-
cumstances" approach also require victim resistance. The following language from
Goldberg v. State, 41 Md. App. 58, 65, 395 A.2d 1213, 1218 (1979) is instructive: Because
"[t]he terms 'force,' 'threat of force,' 'against the will' and 'without the consent' are not de-
fined . . . . [T]he judicially determined meaning of these elements of the common law
crime of rape [are retained]."
10. Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Defnition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1500, 1503-04 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Recent Statutory Developments].
11. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. See Comment, Towards a Consent Standard, supra note 4, at 618-20.
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cases, 13 reflecting the "death before dishonor"14 credo that existed in
the age of chivalry and chastity,15 required that a victim resist her as-
sailant "to the utmost.'
16
This formulation required a woman to resist her assailant to the
full extent of her abilities: 7 first she must have resisted intercourse to
the utmost of her physical capacity,18 and her resistance must not have
abated during the struggle. 19 Voluntary submission to the act of inter-
course, although yielded after assault and attempt to accomplish the act
by force, negated an essential element of the crime of rape.2"
In People v. Dohring,21 a New York court defined the limits of the
"utmost resistance" requirements. Although the court recognized that
"utmost resistance" is a relative term, depending on the strength of the
particular victim, it nevertheless concluded that the victim must resist
until exhausted or overpowered, unless overcome by the number of as-
sailants or the threat of death.22 Later cases23 construed severe beatings
or the threat of death to be sufficiently "coercive" to undermine a wo-
man's resistance.
The requirement that a woman resist her assailant grew out of the
law's suspicion of the credibility of unchaste2
4 or vengeful women.25
13. See infra note 16.
14. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 17-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Brownmiller].
15. Id
16. For the classic example of the utmost resistance standard, see Reynolds v. State, 27
Neb. 90, 91, 42 N.W. 903, 904 (1889). See also State v. Hoffman, 228 Wis. 235, 280 N.W.
357 (1938) (the utmost resistance requirement is overcome if the prosecution can prove the
defendant frightened the victim so as to render her insensible and therefore incapable of
resistance).
17. See Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: an Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Con-
sent, and Character, 11 AM. CRIM, L. Rnv. 309, 328-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hibey,
The Trial of a Rape Case].
18. See Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 10, at 1506. Forcible Rape, 61
VA. L. REV. 1500, 1510-16 (1975).
19. Id
20. Id (citing Starr v. State, 205 Wis. 310, 311-12, 237 N.W. 96, 97 (1931)).
21. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (1874).
22. Id at 382. See also Cascio v. State, 147 Neb. 1075, 1078-79, 25 N.W.2d 897, 900
(1947); Perez v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 34, 37, 94 S.W. 1036, 1038 (1906).
23. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
24. Wigmore states:
Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and
women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are
multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements
or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary phys-
iological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of
contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men. The unchaste (let us call it)
mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex
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Scars of struggle provided visible corroboration of a woman's word,
which was suspect.26 In Lord Hale's words, rape was "an accusation
easily to be made. . . and harder to be defended by the party accused,
tho never so innocent."2 7 Utmost resistance provided the factflnder
with support for the victim's "easily made accusation."28
Rape is a crime that has been defined by nineteenth century no-
tions of women and the female role in society.2 9 As notions of "a wo-
man's place" have changed,3 0 the law has been slow to follow.3'
These negative perceptions 32 of women were expressed in three
separate requirements of proof in rape cases: corroboration, 33 charac-
ter evidence,34 and the resistance requirement.
Corroboration was required at common law, 36 as proof that a wo-
incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the
narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however, too often in
such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any
tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 736 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 3A J. WIGMORE].
25. See Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case.- .4 Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 335, 336 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case]. "It is
assumed by some writers, that men are often unjustly imprisoned because of accusations
brought by malicious women who all too often are afflicted with sexual and emotional
problems. . . . These assumptions are at best questionable." Id at 336 (citing S. ROSEN-
BLATT, JUSTICE DENIED 37 (1971); 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, at 736).
26. The "danger of an erroneous identification in a rape case is not of the same magni-
tude as the danger of a fabricated rape." Franklin v. United States, 330 F.2d 205, 208 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
27. It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and im-
partially to be punished with death; but it must be remembred [sic], that it is an
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved and harder to be defended by
the party accused, tho never so innocent.
1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1971).
28. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FORCI-
BLE RAPE, An Analysis of Legal Issues, 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FORCIBLE RAPE, Legal
Issues].
29. See, e.g., Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case, supra note 25, at 336-37.
30. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation, supra note 3, at 3.
31. Id at 2-7.
32. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
35. See supra/infra notes 10-58 and accompanying text.
36. See Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case, supra note 17. See also Allison v. United
States, 409 F.2d 445, 448 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in which the court noted the following circum-
stances which would corroborate the victim's story:
(1) medical evidence and testimony, (2) evidence of breaking and entering the
prosecutrix' apartment, (3) condition of clothing, (4) bruises and scratches,
(5) emotional condition of prosecutrix, (6) opportunity of accused, (7) conduct of
accused at time of arrest, (8) presence of semen or blood on clothing of accused or
victim, (9) promptness of complaints to friends and police, (10) lack of motive to
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man had not fabricated a claim of rape to "trick" a man and ruin his
reputation. 37 This distorted view of women, in which a woman's word
was considered less credible than a man's, 38 necessitated that objective
evidence or eye-witness reports provide support for a woman's story.39
The corroboration requirement turned the old saw, "rape is a charge
easily made and hard to disprove,"'  on its head. When eye-witness
corroboration is required, rape becomes extremely difficult to prove.4'
Character evidence was used at common law to impeach the credi-
bility of a rape victim.42 Under the common law, a rape victim was on
trial just as much as her assailant.43 Rape trials were often lurid inqui-
sitions into victims' past sexual encounters.' The introduction of char-
acter evidence against rape victims45 made it extremely difficult for a
woman who was "unchaste" to appear as a witness against her assail-
falsify. This list, of course, is not exhaustive, and the corroboration in each case
"must be evaluated on its own merits."
Id (citing Bailey & Humphries v. United States, 405 F.2d 1362, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
37. W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 3 (1979). Ryan explains this phenomenon of
"blaming the victim" as follows:
Twenty years ago, Zero Mostel used to do a sketch in which he impersonated a
Dixicrat Senator conducting an investigation of the origins of World War II. At
the climax of the sketch, the Senator boomed out, in an excruciating mixture of
triumph and suspicion, "What was Pearl Harbor doing in the Pacific?" This is an
extreme example of Blaming the Victim.
38. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. See D. CARROW, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, RAPE: GUIDELINES FOR A COMMUNITY RESPONSE, 174-75 (1980).
42. At trial, evidence of bad reputation or unchastity was generally admissable as sub-
stantive evidence bearing on the contest of the prosecutrix. In a few jurisdictions, the moral
character of the complainant could be a defense to the crime under the theory that an un-
chaste female or one with a bad reputation was likely to have consented. Even when un-
chastity was not considered a defense, evidence of the parties having engaged in prior sexual
relations-or even evidence of prior acquaintance or dating of the parties-could be used to
infer a "continuous state of mind" or the "unlikelihood of a serious attitude of opposition."
See generally FORCIBLE RAPE, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 28, at 21-27; M. AMIR, PATTERNS
IN FORCIBLE RAPE 255-56 (1971).
43. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation, supra note 3, at 12-39.
44. C. SCHURR, RAPE: VICTIM AS CRIMINAL 4, 5 KNOW, INC. (1971).
45. The police, and the courts
have fashioned a stereotype, which contains the attributes assumed to be part of
the true victim's character. Like negligence's reasonable man, the true victim of
rape exercises due care and caution for her own safety. She possesses a reputation
for chastity in her community. Additionally, she copes well with aggression, usu-
ally meeting force with force. Should she fail to overpower her aggressor and rape
occurs, she will make an immediate complaint in a hysterical state.
Comment, Rape in Illinois: A Denial of Equal Protection, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 457,
469 (1975). The victim who fails to live up to this stereotype will often find her complaint
dismissed as unfounded.
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ant.46 At common law, rape was a unique crime in that the victim was
treated as a "prosecutrix, ' 47 rather than as a complaining witness.
48
The term "prosecutrix" is a malignant one, bearing the dark implica-
tions of personal vengeance which were attributed to women who com-
plained of having been raped.49
As the role of women in society has changed, 0 and the credibility
of a woman's word has come to be generally accepted as equal to that
of a man's,5 the requirements of proof in rape have changed. 2 Most
states have discarded the common law's strict corroboration require-
ments,53 and have strictly limited the use of character evidence in rape
cases.14 The common law requirement of resistance, however, has not
been eliminated from the law of rape;55 but it is still as anachronistic as
the corroboration requirement and the use of character evidence.
While many state statutes are modeled on the common law defini-
tion of the crime of rape,56 other states have abandoned the common
law definition in favor of the approach proposed by the Model Penal
Code.
5 7
B. The Model Penal Code
Creation of the Model Penal Code5 8 was an important attempt to
46. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-57 (1966).
47. See Brownmiller, supra note 13, at 327.
48. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation, supra note 3, at 7-12.
49. The myth of the "malicious woman" is discussed in Note, The Victim in a Forcible
Rape Case, supra note 25, at 336-38.
50. See supra notes 4-25 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
52. Thirty-seven states have made substantive changes in their rape laws in the last five
years. See infra APPENDIX "B." These changes are more substantive because they affect the
nature of the proof necessary for a finding of culpability under rape statutes. Many "sex-
neutral" statutes have not made substantive changes in the definition of the crime of rape,
but have merely changed the language which describes the sex of the victim. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1980). "Sex neutral" statutes change the definition of rape
by substituting the term "a person" for the term "a woman." See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261 (West Supp. 1980).
53. Only nine states still require corroboration.
54. Twenty-two states have enacted laws which control the admissibility of evidence of
rape victims' prior sexual conduct. FORCIBLE RAPE, Legal Issues, supra note 28, at 25.
55. See Note, The Resistance Standardin Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 680 (1966).
56. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 58-88 and accompanying text.
58. The MPC has also been the catalyst for recent efforts by the majority of states to
codify their criminal statutes into one integrated whole. See, e.g., Baldwin, Criminal Law
Revision in Delaware and Hawaii, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 476, 479 (1971); Cohen, Criminal
Law Legislation and Legal Scholarshlp, 16 J. LEGAL EDuC. 253, 254 (1964); Fox, Reflections
on the Law Reforming Process, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 443, 444, 459 (1971); Keeton & Reid,
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analyze and recommend changes in the area of criminal law.59 The
code focuses on the actor's conduct,60 as well as the victim's conduct.
6 1
Concerning the actor's conduct, the code requires that the actor "com-
pel" the victim to submit,62 and that he act "for the purposes of
preventing resistance. 63 Under some circumstances, rape victims are
required to evidence non-consent through resistance.64
1. The Model Penal Code's focus on the actor's conduct in
prosecuting rape
Although the Model Penal Code focuses upon the victim's behav-
ior as do the common law66 and California's rape statute,67 the Model
Proposed Revision ofthe Model Penal Code, 45 TEx. L. REV. 399, 404, 405 (1967). See also
Note, Jusification: The Impact ofthe Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 914, 915 (1975).
59. The Model Penal Code official draft was published by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1962, but the sections dealing with sexual assault were substantially devel-
oped as early as 1955 in Tentative Draft No. 4. The MPC was a massive effort to
codify the entire criminal law, including both general principles of criminal liabil-
ity and definitions of specific offenses. The Code built on the common law but
incorporated the perspective of modem theories about the kinds of behavior that
constitute danger to society and to individuals. In the sections governing rape, the
drafters were concerned primarily with specifying the minimum amount of coer-
cion or deception necessary and then devising a rational grading system to classify
all culpable conduct.
Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 10, at 1501.
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4 comment at 241-43 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 303, 313-14 (1980).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 306 (1980).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) provides: "A male who has sexual intercourse with
a female not his wife is guilty of rape if. (a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat
of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on
anyone ....
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(b) provides that a male who has sexual intercourse
with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if: "he has substantially impaired her power to
appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance ...."
64. The comments to Tentative Draft Four of the Model Penal Code indicate that a
victim is required to resist her attacker. "[S]ometimes, in order to make it perfectly clear
that a token initial resistance is not enough, existing law specifies that the woman must resist
'to the utmost.' We believe that the text requirement that she be 'compelled to submit' is
adequate for this purpose." MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4 comment at 246 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955).
The Model Penal Code, however, does not require the victim to resist in order to obtain
a rape conviction. "[T]he lack of resistance on a particular occasion win not preclude a
conviction of rape if the jury can be convinced by the context and the degree of force em-
ployed by the actor that the submission was by compulsion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1
comment at 306-07 (1980).
65. See supra note 61.
66. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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Penal Code also concentrates on the assailant's behavior. Under Cali-
fornia's rape statute6' and the common law,69 rape is a general intent
crime.7" The Model Penal Code,7 1 and those statutes which follow the
Model Penal Code,7 2 however, focus upon the actor's intent: he must
"compel" the victim to submit by force or threat or administer drugs or
intoxicants "for the purpose" of preventing resistance. Only if a victim
is unconscious or under ten years old is the actor's thought process left
unexamined.73 Focusing on the actor's intent, however, may lead to
some bizarre results. For example, in Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Morgan,71 three of the defendants asserted that they were told by the
fourth defendant that his wife would welcome intercourse with each of
them and that they should not be surprised if she struggled a bit, since
she was "kinky." The wife's testimony recounted brutality and humili-
ation. The defendants testified, however, that she had consented will-
ingly and had enjoyed the experience. On the issue of intent, the trial
judge instructed the jury that a person would not be guilty of rape if he
believed that the woman consented, so long as his belief was reason-
able. And in Regina v. Cogan & Leak,75 defendant Cogan admitted
having had intercourse with Mrs. Leak at the urging of her husband.
Although the victim was sobbing, and terrified of her husband, who
had beaten her the night before, the defendant testified that he had
believed she had consented. The jury found that although he had be-
lieved she had consented, he had no reasonable ground for this belief.
The Court of Appeal quashed Cogan's conviction on the basis of the
Morgan rule.76
2. Resistance may be required under the Model Penal Code as
corroborative evidence
Under the Model Penal Code, a rape victim must, under certain
circumstances, evidence resistance.77 While the language of the Code
68. Id
69. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 62.
72. See supra note 55.
73. See supra notes 62 and 63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(c)-(d) provide that a
male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if: "(c) the
female is unconscious; or (d) the female is less than ten years old." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1 comment at 303, 313-14.
74. 2 W.L.R. 913 (1975).
75. The Times (London), June 10, 1975, at 11, col. 6.
76. See supra note 74.
77. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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is neutral in requiring that a victim be "compelled to submit,"7 8 the
commentary to the Code implies that a rape victim must actively resist
her assailant under most circumstances. The Model Penal Code carries
on the common law tradition of distrusting the rape victim's account of
the crime, and questioning her psychological motives for reporting the
rape.79 Comments to the Code indicate that, rather than focusing on
the question of consent, 80 the Code attempts to examine more objective
criteria.
The Model Penal Code provides that a man is guilty of rape if he
has sexual intercourse with a woman and if "with intent to compel her
to submit, he compels her to submit to the act by the use or threat of
force upon her or another person."'" The Comment to this section of
the Code indicates that a victim is required to resist her assailant:
"[s]ometimes, in order to make it perfectly clear that a token initial
resistance is not enough, existing law specifies that the woman must
resist 'to the utmost.' We believe that the text requirement that she be
'compelled to submit' is adequate for this purpose."82 The Model Pe-
nal Code also requires that the rape victim's testimony be corroborated
if the assailant is convicted of a felony.83
While many jurisdictions have followed the Model Penal Code ap-
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79. Searching for consent in a particular case ... may reveal depths of ambiguity
and contradiction that are scarcely suspected when the question is put in the ab-
stract. Often the woman's attitude may be deeply ambivalent. She may not want
intercourse, may fear it, or may desire it but feel compelled to say "no." Her con-
fusion at the time of the act may later resolve into non-consent. Some have ex-
pressed the fear that a woman who subconsciously wanted to have sexual
intercourse will later feel guilty and "cry rape."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 302-03 (1980) (footnote omitted).
80. There are a number of problems that arise if too much emphasis is placed upon
the non-consent of the victim as opposed to the overreaching of the actor. In the
first place, overemphasis on non-consent tends to obscure differences among the
various circumstances covered by the law of rape. An exclusive focus on non-
consent would collect under one label the wholly uninvited and forceful attack by
a total stranger, the excessive zeal of a sometime boyfriend, and the clever seducer
who dupes his victim into believing that they are husband and wife. In the words
of one commentator, such an approach would compress into a single statute a di-
versity of conduct ranging from "brutal attacks. . .to half won arguments.., in
parked cars."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 302 (1980) (quoting Comment, Forcible and Statu-
tory Rape." An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE
L.J. 55, 55-56 (1952)).
81. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1980). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 com-
ment at 308: "the fact of serious bodily injury to the victim . . .provides substantial objec-
tive corrboration of the dangerousness of the actor and thus contributes to the Model Penal
Code objective of reducing the subjectivity of the imposition-consent inquiry."
1983]
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proach to the definition of rape, 84 a large number of states8" have
adopted another approach similar to California's pre-1981 statute.8 6
C. California's P're-1981 Rape Statute
Prior to 1981, California's rape statute required almost as much
victim resistance, as the common law and Model Penal Code defini-
tions of rape.87 The California statute did not require that a rape vic-
tim resist her assailant "to the utmost" 88 as the common law approach
did, but required that a woman resist her assailant and her resistance
be "overcome by force or violence."8 9 In some very limited circum-
stances, the California statute provided a woman need not resist her
assailant where she may be "prevented from resisting by threats of
great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of
execution ...."90
There is a wide variation in what California courts have held to be
a sufficient "threat of great and immediate bodily harm" to obviate the
need for victim resistance. In People v. Crosby,91 the assailant's threat
to slap the victim, and to shoot her at some time in the future, was held
not to be a sufficient threat. However, in People v. Kinne,92 where an
assailant jumped from a stand of shrubs stark naked, grabbed a woman
who was walking down the street and told her "You had better not
scream," the court found that the victim had been subjected to a threat
so severe that resistance was not required.
93
III. CRITICISM OF THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT IN RAPE
Recent studies94 have shown that active, demonstrable resistance
of the type required by the common law, the Model Penal Code, and
the pre-1981 California statute, is an atypical response to rape. Re-
searchers have discovered that victims who resist their assailants have a
greater chance of suffering serious bodily injury than those victims who
84. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1970).
87. See supra notes 10-84 and accompanying text.
88. Id
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(3) (West 1970).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(4) (West 1970).
91. People v. Crosby, 17 Cal. App. 518, 522, 120 P. 441, 442 (1911).
92. People v. Kinne, 25 Cal. App. 2d 112, 76 P.2d 714 (1938).
93. Id at 113-14, 76 P.2d at 715.
94. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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do not resist.95 Additionally, the majority of women faced with violent
assaults, such as rape, will not resist their assailants, but instead will
"freeze" in a state of shock, and may appear to cooperate with their
assailants. For these reasons, the resistance requirement should be
eliminated from rape law because it is unrealistic and may threaten the
rape victim's life.
A. The Resistance Requirement May Threaten Rape Victims' Lives
Rape victims respond to their assailants in a number of ways.
96
Some, in the minority, demonstrate active resistance 97 by fighting or
screaming while others try to talk their assailants out of committing the
crime, 98 through reason or guilt. The majority of rape victims, how-
ever, "freeze." 99 A rationalization process goes on, in which the threat
of rape is contrasted with the threat of death or disfigurement."°° Very
often, rape victims may appear to "go along" with their assailants be-
cause they are afraid to do anything else; 01 no resistance may be
demonstrated, but it would be difficult to find that the victim had truly
95. See infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
96. Symonds, The Rape Victim.- Psychological Patterns of Response, 26 AM. J. PSYCHOA-
NALYSIS 27, 29-33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Symonds].
97. See id at 32:
Active, physical, aggressive behavior is culturally and socially disapproved of, and
this disapproval is so imprinted on women's behavior that one woman said to me:
"I just attended a seminar on how to prevent rape. They told me how to fight back.
Squeeze his testicles, scratch his eyes. Jab him in the groin and try to kill him."
She then stopped and said: "I can't do it-I'd rather be raped."
98. Verbal responses were the most common form of resistance among both rape
and attempted rape victims (70%). This resistance ranged from pleas and meek
appeals to strong refusal. Other verbal methods included:
Moral appeal ("this isn't right" or "what if someone were doing this to your
sister");
Efforts to make herself seem less attractive (by reference to virginity, venereal
disease, or cancer);
Establishing interpersonal liason by relating to the attacker on a personal level
as if trying to make friends;
Intejection of external factors ("my husband will be home soon");
Stalling ("I have to go to the bathroom first").
QUEEN's BENCH FOUNDATION, RAPE PREVENTION AND RESISTANCE 20 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as QUEEN's BENCH FOUNDATION].
99. QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, supra note 98, at 18. "Women in the study were
asked about their primary feelings during the attack and the intensity of these feelings."
While some women said that their primary feeling was terror, most "rape victims (75%). ..
reported being in a state of panic or numbing fear: 'When I saw the knife, I froze. . . . It
was like one of those bad dreams where you want to run, but your legs turn to cement.'
'They could do anything; I was just helpless."'
100. Id
101. Id
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consented to intercourse under the circumstances. 0 2
The Queen's Bench Foundation, °3 in a 1976 study, showed that
victim resistance" (especially screaming,0 5 but also physical resist-
ance'06) tends to precede an increase or intensification of assailants'
102. Symonds notes the following differences between passive and active resistance:
Passive patterns of resistance, verbal or physical, attempt to stop the rapist's behav-
ior by trying to induce guilt or appeal to the rapist's conscience. These patterns of
resistance, which essentially are reluctant acts of submission, are wholly dependent
on the rapist's sense of relatedness to the victim's need to inhibit his behavior.
While there have been reports of incidents in which these responses have worked,
generally they fail to stop the rape, and instead of making the rapist feel guilty,
they often make him angry.
Active patterns of resistance are directed to produce fear in the rapist, that is,
fear of being hurt, caught, or exposed if he persists in his attack on the victim. This
may stop the attack if done early in the rapist-victim contact. Verbal active resist-
ance usually consists of screaming something like, "Get the hell out of here," "I'll
call the cops." Physical patterns of active resistance are fighting, kicking, scratch-
ing, biting, running, fleeing, jumping out of a car, and the use of weapons. The
danger is often that insufficient or delayed physical resistance may be overcome by
more force from the rapist. In active patterns of resistance there is no appeal to the
rapist's inner feeling of conscience. . . It is a fight for survival with a predator.
Symonds, supra note 96, at 32.
103. See supra note 98.
104. QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, supra note 98, at 85-86.
105. Id
106. Correlations in the previous sections show that victim resistance (especially
screaming, but also physical resistance), feelings of fright on the part of some as-
sailants after they had initiated their assaults, fears of being caught if their victims
"blew it" either during the assault or afterwards, victim anger, victim calmness or
appearance of control during the attack instead of fright, and sometimes victim
passiveness tended to precede an increase and/or an intensification of assailants'
violence, ranging from wielding a weapon to actual infliction of injury, In approxi-
mately 7% of the cases studied, offenders recalled becoming extremely angry and
sometimes more violent when they could not get an erection to consummate the
rape.
The study also indicated that the rapes which were motivated by the desire/for
revenge upon certain individual women were often more violent than the others.
In what was clearly the most excessively violent of all the sexual assaults described
in the study, a 24 year old participant recalled the following experiences:
I asked her to go to the party. . . . [S]he started calling me a son-of-a-
bitch, etc., and accused me of robbing her house. . . . This was five days
after I had gotten out of the County Jail. . . . I was getting really para-
noid as she said she was going to call the police. . . . (Later that night
around 11:30 p.m.) I saw her standing there in a negligee drinking a beer
... . Then I thought, "this nasty bitch is no good for anything but to be
used. I'm going to fix her now so she doesn't screw anybody else."
Armed with a butcher's knife, this offender entered this woman's house, and beat
her continuously until daylight, dragging her all over the house, kicking her repeat-
edly, cutting her (she sustained several lacerations in her vagina), and eventually
stabbing her through one hand to the floor. He left her thinking he had killed her.
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violence."°7 The response of assailants to victim resistance in this study
showed some variation.10 8 A large percentage'09 (54.8%) of the assail-
ants in the study reported getting more violent, sometimes losing con-
trol,110 when their victims resisted.
107. Typically, participants said they increased their violence when their expecta-
tions for the rape were not being met by the victim; 68.5% wanted their victims to
comply with their expectations.
How does the assailant respond to victim resistance?
The responses of assailants to victim resistance in this study showed some va-
riation. A large percentage (54.8%) reported getting more violent, sometimes los-
ing control. Often the response was anger (47.9%). On the other hand, 34.2% felt
powerful, dominant or good; 30.1% felt scared; and 27.4% felt excited.
Id at 85.
108. Bard & Elleson, Crisis Intervention and Investigation of Forcible Rape, reprinted in L.
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS 163, 168 (1977). "Recent re-
search on rape suggests that the intent of the offender is more often aggressive than sexual to
prove his own masculinity and invulnerability by scapegoating and degrading the victim."
109. QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, supra note 98, at 80.
1. What is a man looking for when he rapes?
According to most of the respondents in this study, 50.7% (37),power or
dominance over their victims was their primary goal: "to overpower and con-
trol" them. This theme was expressed in a variety of forms:
A 24 year old who had raped a 28 year old woman recounted a story charac-
teristic of others related in the course of the study:
I walked off from a County farm; I had rape on my mind. I intended to
rape this chick I know. . . but some people came. . .I went over to this
lady's house. . .I was talking to her, stalling time, really planning how
to rip her off. . . .By "rape," I don't just mean intercourse. I mean to
go through all the changes-me getting what I wanted. If she had agreed
to give me a head job, I would have said, "No" and not raped her. If she
had said, "yeah, let's go to bed," I would have said 'Wo," as she would
have been in control.
A 34 year old offender defined rape as misdirected violence aimed at the
achievement of dominance and power, which he believed most people achieve
through communication and love. A 33 year old man who raped a 19 year old
hitchhiker explained his rape as a means of expressing apower-fantasy: "My fan-
tasy was-before I stopped-that she was teasing me. So I had an attitude of 'I'll
show you' . I wanted power over her . . . power to overcome my fear of wo-
men."
Another 20 year dld who raped a 40 year old woman explained:
She was cooperating. It was fulfilling my fantasy (from before I woke her
up). She was doing it just like it was nothing. My fantasy was she would
give me what I wanted because I had the knife and she was scared. I
wanted her to be scared to keep me in control.
110. For many of the offenders, exertion of dominance and power included elements
of revenge and humiliation. Often it was not sufficient to control the victim, but
the offender wished to "put her down" as well. For example, a 21 year old who
raped a 42 year old woman said that initially he was seeking sex, but his account
suggests more:
I asked her to go out; she said "another time." ... I was interested in sex.
I continued to tell her I wanted to take her out. She got even more upset
.... She slapped me and called me a punk. I got upset, so I knocked
the shit out of her. "I'll show you; you just don't do that to me." I de-
graded the skit out of her. I was just getting even dealing with myself
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The Department of Justice, in a 1979 study of rape victimiza-
tion,"' compared the use of resistance' t2 by rape victims and the inci-
dence of additional injuries incurred by these victims," 3 and found
that rape victims who resisted their assailants were more likely to be
injured than those who did not." 4 Sixty-six percent" 5 of those who
resisted were injured," 6 as compared to only thirty-four percent of
those who did not resist."17
B. Active Resistance is an Atypical Response to Rape
Another argument for the elimination of the resistance require-
ment lies in the findings of recent studies" i8 which indicate that active
resistance to rape is an atypical victim response.'l 9 A study of rape
victims' 2 noted that the first response of all individuals to sudden, un-
expected violence' is shock and disbelief.12 2 When realization sets in,
the vast majority of victims experience fright bordering on panic.'2 3
This fright-panic response is especially true when the individual feels
that her life is in imminent danger.1
2 4
The behavior of the vast majority of women 2 5 during their con-
Id at 80.
Ill. M. McDermott, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal
Justice Information and Statistics Service, RAPE VICTIMIZATION IN 26 AMERICAN CITIES
(1979) [hereinafter cited as RAPE VICTIMIZATION].
112. Id at 40.
113. Id at 41.
114. Id
115. Id
116. Or suffered greater injuries than those victims who did not resist suffered. Id
117. Id
118. QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, supra note 98, at 21; RAPE VICTIMIZATION, supra
note 111, at 35; Symonds, supra note 96.
119. QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, supra note 98, at 19-21. See also supra notes 95-117.
120. Symonds, supra note 96, at 27.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id
124. Id at 30.
125. Symonds gives several examples of victim behavior: a young woman who was
raped described her reaction as follows: "I was just that scared. I would have done
anything he asked. I felt he was capable of anything, including killing me. He
reminded me of my father, his looks and the violence. It seemed to reinforce my
fear of him."
After she was raped, she went quietly with him to his car and he drove her to a
bus stop. She thanked him and he left.
A rapist blamed a girl of eighteen for his having torn her clothing. He said she
had not cooperated with him. She started to cry and said, "I'm sorry I was bad."
Symonds, supra note 96, at 30.
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tact with rapists demonstrates that victims not only submit to their as-
sailants 26 but also demonstrate a response known as "psychological
infantilism"' 27 which makes it appear to the outsider that they are
friendly and cooperative.12
The frozen fright response 129 of "psychological infantilism" is con-
fusing to the rapist, the victim 13° and the police alike. The victim may
appear relaxed and calm, but she is actually in terror. Frozen fright
has its roots in profound primal terror.'
3 '
Rape victims may make submissive signs to the rapist in order to
inhibit his aggressive action.' 32 Sometimes, the suspense of the threat
to life is so painful that the victim wants the ordeal over in order to
obtain relief.' 33 These victims close their eyes and try to leave their
bodies with the rapist.' 34 They say to the rapist, "Get it over with."'
135
In another study, 36 rape victims were asked about their primary
feelings 37 and the intensity of those feelings during the attack. Most
said their primary feeling was terror, 38 and seventy-five percent of the
victims reported being in a state of panic or fear.'
39
The fears of rape victims centered around injury and death. One
noted, "I could get killed. They might beat me to a bloody pulp and
leave me in a field someplace,"" and another reported, "I knew right
away he knows how to kill because he was holding the two arteries that
bring blood to your brain. He choked me so hard I knew it was a
126. Id
127. Id
128. Id
129. Id
130. Id Symonds notes that terror and rage may coexist in rape victims, and in some
cases may lead to resistance by the victim:
In the light of the traumatic psychological infantilism (frozen-fright response)
that most victims of violent crime undergo, it is surprising we see any resistance
patterns at all. Yet resistance to violent crimes does occur. Many victims experi-
ence anger as well as fright. However, fright and anger occurring at the same time
is an explosive amalgam and is dangerous to the victim, especially if the criminal is
still present, threatening imminent violence for noncompliance.
Id at 31.
131. Id
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id
136. See QUEEN's BENCH FOUNDATION, supra note 98, at 1-27.
137. Id at 7-11.
138. Id at 18-19.
139. Id at 18.
140. Id
19831
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matter of seconds before you can die."' 1 Most of the women in this
study reported that they feared they would be killed.' 4 2
C. The Resistance Requirement Should Be
Eliminatedfrom Rape Statutes
The resistance requirement should be eliminated from the defini-
tion of rape because it reflects an unfortunate compendium of miscon-
ceptions 43 about men, women and rape. This requirement establishes
an unrealistic standard by creating the presumption that a woman who
has not actively resisted her assailant has consented to the rape, 144 and
the act is, therefore, not criminal. Studies of rapist behavior and rape
victims' injuries have shown that often resistance will prompt a more
violent assault. 14 Studies of victims' responses to rapists' assaults show
that "frozen fright" (the victim's complete inability to respond to, or to
resist, her assailant) is a more common reaction to rape than active
resistance.' 46 Increasingly, the professional literature 47 indicates that
there are many situations in which resistance is not a valid measure of
lack of consent by rape victims.'
48
IV. PROPOSALS FOR ELIMINATING THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT
The California and Michigan legislatures have attempted to rede-
fine rape and the resistance requirement, but due to ambiguous lan-
guage and poor definition of terms, neither have succeeded in
eliminating the resistance requirement from the law of rape.
A. The California Levine Bill's Robbery Model
The Los Angeles County Bar Association's (LACBA) Rape Legis-
lation Committee recently reviewed a number of proposals for chang-
ing California's rape law.' 49 In April, 1980, a bill reflecting the
Committee's approach was introduced in the California Assembly by
Assemblyman Mel Levine.'50 The bill was enacted into law in Janu-
141. Id
142. Id
143. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
144. Id
145. See supra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 119-42 and accompanying text.
147. Id
148. Id
149. Interview with Aileen Adams, Recording Secretary of the LACBA Rape Legislation
Committee, in Los Angeles (March 1980).
150. A.B. 2899, introduced March 6, 1980, amended April 7, 1980.
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ary, 1981.151
The LACBA Committee determined that California's rape statute
should be revised to reflect the language used in California's robbery
statute for several reasons: 52 the language of the robbery statute is
simple, clear and has been tested and defined in the California
courts;153 the language of the robbery statute has been interpreted
through a large body of case law to require less physical violence than
is required under the rape statute; 54 and there are similarities between
assailant behavior and victim response in rape and robbery.' 55
1. Similarities between the crimes of rape and robbery
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has
classified rape,' 56 along with personal robbery and assault, 157 as a per-
sonal crime of violence. According to the LEAA, "all bring the victim
into direct contact with the offender."'5 " In rape, physical harm is
much more than a threat; it is a reality because violence is an integral
part of the act. Body contact and physical intrusion are the purpose of
the crime, not appropriation of a removable item like money. Yet the
nature of the crime of rape, as it is committed, bears a close resem-
blance to robbery. The sexual goal of the rapist resembles the mone-
tary goal of the robber.' 59 Victim response in rape also resembles
victim response to robbery more closely than to other crimes in that
people who find themselves in an assaultive situation usually defend
themselves by fighting back, while rape and robbery victims usually do
not.16
0
Our legal codes and court procedures, nevertheless, continue to
uphold the unrealistic and unsafe expectation that victims of rape
should fight back. Rape is the only violent crime in which the victim's
resistance is a crucial issue in the successfuf prosecution of the of-
fender. 6 ' The inconsistencies in our social learning are striking. Soci-
151. The bill was signed on September 17, 1980.
152. See supra note 149.
153. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 166-94 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
156. See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2.
157. Id. at 26.
158. Id. at 33.
159. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 384.
160. Id at 385.
161. [R]obbery and assault, like rape, are crimes which are defined to include both
force and nonconsent as elements. Although these definitions reflect a recognition
that most transfers of property and most touchings are consensual and that a per-
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ety teaches that when confronted with a violent person in threatening
situations other than rape, the safest strategy is to cooperate and com-
ply with his demands. 62 Victims of robbery who respond with "take
my money, take anything, just don't hurt me" are certainly not suspect
because of their non-resistance and, in fact, are commended for acting
correctly 63 These attitudes and beliefs about sexual versus other as-
saults, though inconsistent, are deeply ingrained in our culture, and the
courts impose them upon rape victims.' 4
2. Evidence of non-consent in robbery cases
California's robbery statute requires that the crime be committed
"against the will"'65 of the victim, and that the victim be compelled to
submit to the robbery by "force or fear."' 66 Fear is defined as either
"the fear of unlawful injury to the person or property of the person
robbed, or of any relative of his or member of his family," 67 or as "the
fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of
anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the rob-
bery." 68 Such fear may arise from the use, or threat of use, of physical
violence by the actor, or from the actor's threatening the victim with a
deadly weapon. 69
The minimum amount of "force or fear" necessary for a taking to
be considered a robbery is perhaps best defined by the "purse snatch-
son needs the freedom to engage in these activities, this recognition does not ex-
-pand into a legal expectation that one who charges commission of these crimes
does so falsely. Instead, the law interprets consent so as to further the policy of
physical protection by focusing on the behavior of one who inflicts harm rather
than on the actions of one who receives it. In robbery cases the courts set a low
standard of force to prove victim fear and hence non consent, applying a reason-
able man test. This policy is consistent with the advice of law enforcement officers
to give up property when confronted by a thief, and to run or at least protect vital
organs when assaulted. The law does not expect a person to risk serious injury or
death in defense of self or property.
Comment, Towards a Consent Standard, supra note 4, at 637-38.
162. Id
163. R. GREEN, HUMAN SEXUALITY: A HEALTH PRACTITIONER'S TEXT (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as R. GREEN, HUMAN SEXUALITY].
164. Id
165. "Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another,
from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force
or fear." CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1970). While not specified in the statutory lan-
guage, robbery has been held to be a specific intent crime (see Use Note to CALJIC No. 9.10
(1982 Revision) which states: "Though not stated in the code definition, robbery is a specific
intent crime, and the jury must be so instructed sua sponte.")
166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 212 (West 1970).
167. Id
168. Id
169. Id
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ing" cases.7 ° In People v. Welch, 1' the court held that a purse snatch-
ing had met the "force or fear" standard; although the victim had not
been threatened, the force used was enough to have broken the victim's
purse-strap.17 2 In People v. Morales,?73 however, the court held that
where the victim of a purse-snatching had not been threatened prior to
the snatching, and it was unclear that force was used to accomplish the
snatching, "the jury might have entertained a reasonable doubt as to
whether defendant used sufficient force in his snatching of the purse for
the theft to constitute robbery."' 74 The Morales court found that the
trial court had erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense
of grand theft. The court noted that "something more is required
[under the robbery statute] than just that quantum of force which is
necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property."'
75
Perhaps People v. Renteria176 represents the lower limits of the
"force or fear" standard. In Renteria, the court inferred from the cir-
cumstances surrounding the robbery that the victim must have acted
from fear, 77 even though he specifically denied this motivation. 7  The
court in Renteria noted:
The People are not "bound" by the clerk's testimony that he
was not in fear, since there is other evidence which will sup-
port the conclusion that he acted in fear and would not have
disgorged the contents of his employer's till except in fear of
the harm which might come to him or his employer if he
failed to comply with the defendant's demands.1
79
3. Evidence of non-consent in rape cases
Although the Renteria court was willing to infer that the victim
was motivated by fear, no court has yet inferred this motivation in in-
terpreting the language of California's rape statute.'8 0 One of the cir-
cumstances under which sexual intercourse is defined as rape is
170. Purse snatching requires very little force, and often the victim is not aware of the
theft until the moment it occurs-arguably, in that situation, there is also not much fear.
171. 218 Cal. App. 2d 422, 31 Cal. Rptr. 926 (1963).
172. Id at 423, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
173. 49 Cal. App. 3d 134, 122 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1975).
174. Id at 138, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
175. Id at 139, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
176. 61 Cal. 2d 497, 393 P.2d 413, 39 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1964).
177. Id at 499, 393 P.2d at 414, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
178. Id at 498, 393 P.2d at 414, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
179. Id at 499, 393 P.2d at 414, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
180. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1983).
Section 261 of the California Penal Code was originally enacted in 1872. The section
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"[w]here it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force or
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or an-
other."'' A second circumstance is "[w]here the act is accomplished
against the victim's will by threatening to retaliate in the future against
the victim or any other person, and there is a reasonable possibility that
the perpetrator will execute the threat."'82 Under former sections of
the law, it has been held that the rape victim must make manifest her
unwillingness to yield to an attack,8 3 though the extent to which she
must resist her assailant is for the victim to decide.8 4 The victim need
not resist beyond the point at which she feels her life and safety endan-
gered.'85 The trial court will determine whether her fears were reason-
ably grounded.' 86 In determining the degree of resistance required to
establish the offense of rape, among the factors the court wil consider
are the relative strengths of the parties, and the uselessness of the vic-
tim's resistance.1
8 7
The following cases illustrate the level of force or violence used by
the assailant which the courts have held to be high enough to justify
non-resistance on the part of the victim. In People v. Adkins,'88 the
defendant held the blade of a knife to the victim's throat, talked of
having killed a man in the army, and of killing her, and stated he
would stick the knife into her throat if she did not submit. In People v.
Frye,189 the victim was threatened by an assailant armed with a knife;
she managed to disarm him. He then pressed something against her
back, and told her to walk or he would shoot her; he had no gun.
Threats of great and immediate bodily harm used to overcome the
victim's resistance need not be verbal.'90 Where a nude man grabbed a
woman who was walking down the street, struck her in the mouth and
was amended three times (1889, 1897, 1913) to increase the age of consent (for statutory
rape) from ten years to eighteen years.
Subsection three of section 261 was amended in 1897 (at that time it was subsection
four) to change the language threats of "immediate and great" bodily harm to the present
"great and immediate" language.
In 1970, former subsection one, relating to sexual intercourse with a female under 18
(statutory rape) was deleted from this section; it became CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5.
181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1982).
182. Id
183. People v. Peckham, 232 Cal. App. 2d 163, 167, 42 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1965).
184. Id
185. People v. Harris, 108 Cal. App. 2d 84, 89, 238 P.2d 158, 161 (1951).
186. Id
187. People v. Nash, 261 Cal. App. 2d 216, 67 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1968).
188. 165 Cal. App. 2d 29, 331 P.2d 195 (1958).
189. 117 Cal. App. 2d 101, 255 P.2d 105 (1953).
190. People v. Kinne, 25 Cal. App. 2d 112, 76 P.2d 714 (1938).
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said, "You had better not scream," the man's conduct was held to have
amounted to a threat of great and immediate bodily harm. 91
Two recent cases illustrate the minimum amount of force, or threat
of bodily harm, that the courts have found sufficient to support a con-
viction of rape. In People v. Hunt,'92 the defendant did not utter any
threats to the victim. The victim, a hitchhiker, entered the defendant's
campertruck. Several miles before her intended destination, the de-
fendant pulled off the freeway and onto a deserted road. The victim,
remembering that a friend had been killed in similar circumstances,
offered to perform oral copulation with the defendant. The defendant
agreed; he and the victim also engaged in sexual intercourse in the back
of the campertruck. The People's theory in prosecuting the case was
that the threat of harm could be inferred from the circumstances. The
court of appeal found no implied threat of harm, though the court did
state that the case was "a very close one indeed,"' 93 and overturned the
defendant's conviction based on an error in the trial court's instructions
to the jury.
194
In People v. King,195 the court found that the victim had been pre-
vented from resisting her attacker by threats sufficient to satisfy the
statutory requirements. The two defendants took the victim into an
isolated park and they escorted her, one on each arm, into a secluded
area. The court found that "[t]he fact that there were two men of con-
siderable size and obvious strength, and the. . . area to which she [the
victim] had been taken against her wishes [supplied] the elements of
reasonable expectation of great danger. Compliance with the orders of
the men reasonably comports with the suppression of resistance."' 96
4. Summary: a comparison of rape and robbery
Rape is a crime of violence; however, unlike other crimes of vio-
lence, such as robbery, the onus of proving that a rape has been com-
mitted is placed on the victim of the crime. The rape victim's conduct
191. Id at 113, 76 P.2d at 715.
192. 72 Cal. App. 3d 190, 198, 139 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1977).
193. Id at 199, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
194. Id, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 679. The court did note:
Even the most subjectively determined rapist cannot be convicted of rape if
without any use of threat or force he persuades a female to consent, and on the
other hand, even the most subjectively frightened female cannot consent to inter-
course and then claim to have been raped when that fear does not have a reason-
able basis in the overt actions of the alleged rapist.
Id at 200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
195. 94 Cal. App. 3d 696, 156 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1979).
196. Id at 701, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
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is scrutinized in a way that the conduct of other victims of violent
crimes is not. Traditional rape statutes require that the victim act in a
manner which clearly demonstrates her nonacquiescence to the act of
intercourse.'97 A victim of an assault with a deadly weapon,198 or of an
armed robbery, 199 is presumed not to have consented to the crime.
Under traditional rape statutes the presence of a deadly weapon in the
rapist's possession does not obviate the need for a victim to manifest
non-consent to the crime.2c°
The law presumes that one will not give away that which is his to a
robber,20 1 but makes no similar presumption as to the conduct of wo-
men and rapists.20 2 While both rape and robbery statutes provide that
only non-consensual acts are criminal,20 3 only rape statutes have re-
quired that a victim manifest her non-consent through resistance.2°
California's Levine Bill was designed to eliminate the resistance re-
quirement from the law of rape by using the language of robbery to
define rape.20 5
5. The Levine Bill
The drafters of the Levine Bill intended that the "force and fear"
language (which requires much less of victims of robbery than the lan-
guage of the California rape statute requires of rape victims 2°6) be ap-
plied to rape cases. The Levine Bill was signed into law by Governor
Brown in September, 1980.207 As redrafted, the relevant language of
the Levine Bill states: "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accom-
plished with a person . . . under any of the following circumstances:
Where it is accomplished against a person's will be means of force or
197. See supra notes 10-94 and accompanying text.
198. See B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 264 (1972).
199. See B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 430-40 (1972).
200. See Comment, Towards a Consent Standard, supra note 4, at 640-42. See also People
v. Crosby, 17 Cal. App. 518, 521-22, 120 P. 441, 442 (1911), in which the assailant's threat to
slap the victim, and to shoot her at some time in the future, was held not to be sufficient to
convict the assailant under California law, which requires that the victim be "prevented
from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent
power of execution." CAL. PENAL CODE § 211(4) (West 1970) (current version at CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 261(2) (West Supp. 1983)).
201. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 165-94 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 165-94 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 157, 161-94 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 151.
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fear."2 ° While this language eliminates the victim resistance standard
from theface of California's rape law, it may be interpreted to continue
to require victim resistance. The language of the robbery statute, upon
which this Bill is based, is identical to the language of the common law
definition of rape.2"9 Under the common law, courts required that rape
victims resist to the utmost.210
The Levine Bill provides no legislative history,21I definitions or
other indications 12 that the intent of the drafters was to eliminate the
resistance requirement from California's rape law. Maryland's rape
statute was revised in a manner similar to California's.1 3 The Mary-
land Court of Appeals,21 4 in interpreting the revised statute, found that
because the terms "force" and "against the wilr' were not defined in
the Maryland statute, "the judicially determined meaning of these ele-
ments of the common law crime of rape are retained. :215 It is not diffi-
cult to imagine the California courts reaching a similar result.
The Levine Bill has removed the victim resistance standard from
California's rape statute. It will not remove the resistance requirement
from the law. By returning to the common law definition of rape, this
bill will call up hobgoblins of hundreds of years of common law.216 It
is not clear whether a court would find the analogy to California's rob-
bery law when there is the much more ready analogy to the common
law.21 7 The courts may still imply resistance as a way of proving that
the victim acted "against her will."
A carefully drafted rape statute must define all terms in a clear
and unambiguous manner. The language of such a statute must not
echo the language of the common law, for if it does, the danger exists
that courts might require even more victim resistance than courts pres-
ently do.
B. The Michigan Statute
Whereas California attempted to eliminate the resistance standard
from its rape law by grafting the language of robbery onto rape, Michi-
208. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
210. Id
211. See infra APPENDIX "C."
212. Id
213. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
214. Id
215. Id
216. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
217. Id
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gan approached redefinition of consent in the law of rape in a different
manner.218 Rather than require that a woman evidence non-consent to
rape219 by resisting her assailant,220 Michigan's statute categorizes those
situations in which it is extremely unlikely that a woman would have
consented to intercourse.
221
The Michigan statute does not mention consent, but instead states
that "[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct . . . if he or she
engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the
following circumstances exists . *"222 A long list of the criminal cir-
cumstances follow. 2
23
In the last several years, nineteen states have adopted "criminal
218. The Michigan statute obviates the problem by focusing on the circumstances of the
crime, rather than on the consent of the victim. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b-g
(Supp. 1979).
219. There are many statistically common situations in which it can be presumed that
consent to intercourse has not been given. Statistics show that a large number of rapes occur
in victims' homes (38% of the incidents occurred in or near the victim's home; RAPE VICTIM-
IZATION, supra note I 11, at 18), where entry has been gained by the assailant through stealth
(18% of the cases, QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, supra note 98, at 14). It is unlikely that a
victim would consent in such a situation. It is also highly unlikely that a woman would
consent to being beaten, threatened with a weapon, or gang-raped. A large number of rape
victims are hitchhikers; rather than blaming the victim when a rape occurs while the victim
is hitchhiking, the legal presumption should be one of non-consent-asking for a ride is not
the same as "asking for it." See, e.g., S. NELSON & M. AMIR, THE HITCHHIKE VICTIM OF
RAPE, A RESEARCH REPORT, reprinted in D. CHAPPELL, FORCIBLE RAPE 272 (1977).
Less common situations also arise in which it is unlikely that a woman would consent to
intercourse; when a woman has been bound, or kidnapped, it is improbable that she freely
consented to an act of intercourse. See, e.g., J. BENDOR, Justice after Rape: Legal Reform in
Michigan in M. WALKER, S. BROADSKY, SEXUAL ASSAULT 149, 155 (1976).
220. See supra notes 10-94 and accompanying text.
221. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b-g (Supp. 1983).
222. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (1982).
223. The following circumstances are first degree crimes under MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520b:
(a) That other person is under 13 years of age.
(b) The other person is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is a
member of the same household as the victim, the actor is related to the victim by
blood or affinity to the fourth degree to the victim, or the actor is in a position of
authority over the victim and used this authority to coerce the victim to submit.
(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the commission of
any other felony.
(d) The actor is aided and abetted by I or more other persons and either of the
following circumstances exists:
(i) The' actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defec-
tive, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.
(ii) The actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration.
Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any of the circumstances listed in
subdivision (f)(i) to (v).
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a man-
ner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to
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circumstances" rape statutes.224 Of these, only two statutes explicitly
remove the resistance requirement from the law.2 25 Nine statutes ex-
plicitly require victim resistance.226 The remaining eight statutes use
language which is sufficiently ambiguous to allow the courts to imply
the resistance requirement.
227
accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any
of the following circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of
physical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force
or violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the present
ability to execute these threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate
in the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that
the actor has the ability to execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, "to
retaliate" includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion.
224. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-401 to -403 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 763, 764,
767 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1-.5 (West 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.010-.060
(Baldwin 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A §§ 251-255 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.341-.345 (West Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 28-317 to -320 (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.364 (1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 632-A:1 - A:4 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10 to -9-12 (Supp. 1982); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01-.12 (Baldwin 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651 to -3-654
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-602 (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13 §§ 3251-3253 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.010-.100 (1983); W. VA. CODE
§§ 61-8B-1 to -8B-9 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 6-2-301 to -306 (1977).
225. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i: "A victim need not resist the actor in prosecu-
tion under sections 520b to 520g." N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10 to -9-12 (Supp. 1979). The
New Mexico statute is quite vague. The statute uses "force" to define "force or coercion":
"A. 'Force or coercion' means: (1) the use of physicalforce or physical violence." (empha-
sis added). N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-1OA(1) (Supp. 1982).
In State v. Jiminez, 89 N.J. 652, 556 P.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1976), the statute was found not
unconstitutionally vague by the court, which used the following tortured language in ex-
plaining its holding: "[T]he language 'perpetrated by the use of force or coercion' is vague
." since "[t]he crime is defined in terms of a result that defendant causes. If a defendant
causes such a result by the use of force or coercion, force or coercion was the method which
caused the result (the crime)."
Id. at 657-58, 556 P.2d at 65-66.
226. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1-.5 (West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.010-.060
(Baldwin 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A §§ 251-255 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-
317 to -320 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.364 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2907.01-.12 (Baldwin 1979); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.010-.12 (West Supp. 1983); W.
VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-1 to -8B-9 (1977); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-301 to -306 (1983).
227. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-401 to -403 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 763, 764,
767 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.341-.345 (West Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-503 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1 to -A:4 (Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-3-651 to -3-654 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 3251-3253 (Supp.
1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983). See also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
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1. Problems in the construction of the Michigan statute
The Michigan statute divides the crime of rape into four degrees.
The degree of the crime determines the severity of the punishment.228
In its definition of first degree rape alone, the Michigan statute sets
forth fourteen different circumstances in which intercourse is presumed
to have occurred without the victim's consent.229
The Michigan statute, in providing a long and complex "laundry
list" of criminal circumstances, runs the risk of being restrictively ap-
plied by courts applying the rule of construction that everything which
is not included in an extensive list is deemed to have been purposely
excluded.23 It is quite possible that a rape case will "fall between the
cracks" of the statute's list of criminal circumstances, and thus go
unpunished.
In fact, the language used in defining the "criminal circumstances"
in statutes similar to the Michigan statute has been interpreted by one
court as requiring victim resistance.23' While the Michigan statute
states that no resistance is required, the internal conflict (in listing the
criminal circumstances) may result in an outcome contrary to that
which its drafters intended.232 Only a carefully drawn statute which
explicitly states that no resistance is required of a rape victim will in-
sure that the resistance will be eliminated from the law of rape.
A more flexible approach to the definition of rape, in which a "rea-
sonable person" test is used, would eliminate the problem posed by the
Michigan statute, and would make it unlikely that a rape case would go
unpunished because it failed to conform to the rigid list of "criminal
circumstances" provided by the Michigan statute.
V. A PROPOSED MODEL RAPE STATUTE
The following proposed model rape statute is designed to elimi-
nate the resistance requirement from the law of rape. The statute is
228. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West Supp. 1979).
The comments to § 213.1 of the Model Penal Code discuss Michigan's grading of the
crime as follows: "[T]he grading judgments are in some cases highly debatable, in some
cases much more questionable, and in some cases simply bizarre." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1 comment at 298 (1980).
229. See supra note 224.
230. Id
231. Goldberg v. State, 41 Md. App. 58, 65, 395 A.2d 1213, 1218 (1979) (construing MD,
CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 462 (1976)).
232. In criticizing the Michigan statute, the Model Penal Code stated: "[T]he actor must
'overcome' the victim by physical force, yet section 520i provides that the victim 'need not
resist."' MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 296 (1980).
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designed to be clear and unambiguous in its intention in order to elimi-
nate the possibility that a court will imply the resistance requirement.
The pitfalls of the Michigan and California approaches have been
circumvented. Unlike Michigan's statute,233 the proposed model stat-
ute is short and concise. The "criminal circumstances" 234 approach is
abandoned in favor of the "reasonable person" test, which is flexible
enough to cover all rape situations.235
The intention of the drafters of the statute, to eliminate the resist-
ance requirement from the law of rape, is clearly set forth, both in the
definition of the crime and in the body of the statute.236
The statute does not follow the Levine Bill's 237 approach of using
terms such as "against the will of the victim" or "force or fear" in the
definition of the crime of rape.2 38 When statutory language is closely
linked to common law interpretations of the crime of rape, it is inevita-
ble that courts will look to common law standards and will require that
rape victims evidence non-consent through resistance. 239 Thus, the
proposed model statute carefully avoids reliance on any of the above
terms.24o
A. Definitions
A clear definition of consent, however, must be provided for in a
forcible rape statute designed to eliminate the resistance require-
ment.241 Resistance was originally required as a means of proving non-
233. See supra notes 219-28 and accompanying text.
234. Id
235. See infra note 228.
236. Id
237. See supra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
238. Id
239. Id
240. Definitionsfor Forcible Rape
Consent: Consent is the freely given assent to an act of intercourse. Resistance is not
required as a means of showing non-consent.
Forcible Rape: Forcible rape is the act of sexual intercourse committed under the fol-
lowing circumstances: Where a reasonable person, were he or she in the victim's place,
would not have consented to the act of intercourse, in the light of the perpetrator's actions
and all of the surrounding circumstances. A victim need not resist his or her assailant under
this statute.
241. Like robbery and assault, rape is a nonconsensual and forcible version of an
ordinary human interaction. Yet only the law of rape makes unjustified adverse
assumptions about the general sincerity of alleged victims, which lead to require-
ments of much higher levels of proof of force and resistance. Such requirements
leave the physical safety of women correspondingly less protected in cases of rape
than in cases of robbery or simple assault. At a time when police and public inter-
est groups advise women to submit to rapists in order to minimize physical injury,
courts should apply the reasonable man standard developed in robbery cases to
1983]
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consent in rape,242 yet once resistance is eliminated as a means of prov-
ing that intercourse occurred without the victim's consent, the statutory
definition of consent becomes crucial.243
The proposed model statute defines consent as "the freely given
assent to an act of intercourse." This language implies that such assent
is given without the victim being subjected to force or coercion.244
B. The Criminal Standard
The proposed model rape statute employs the "reasonable person"
standard as a test for determining whether forcible rape has oc-
curred.2 45 The factfinder is asked to determine whether or not a rea-
sonable person in the victim's place would have consented to the act of
intercourse, in light of the perpetrator's actions and all of the surround-
ing circumstances.
246
This "reasonable person" test is much more flexible than the
"criminal circumstances" test of the Michigan statute, and thus lessens
the chance that rapes occurring under certain circumstances will go un-
punished because they fall outside of rigid statutory categories. 247 The
reasonable person test avoids the pitfalls of California's Levine Bill by
using language unlike that of the common law, the Model Penal Code,
or any other statutory definition of rape which has been interpreted as
requiring victim resistance.24
The proposed model statute makes explicit that which was the un-
realized hope of the Levine Bill and the Michigan statute: that resist-
ance is no longer required in the crime of rape.
It is hoped that a clear, concise and explicit statute, such as the
proposed model statute, will succeed where the Levine Bill and Michi-
gan statute have failed, and that the resistance requirement will be,
once and for all, retired from the law of rape.
determine consent and allow juries to evaluate available evidence of force, fear and
resistance as indicia of consent, rather than holding particular levels of these crite-
ria to be absolute prerequisites for convictions.
Comment, Towards a Consent Standard, supra note 4, at 638.
242. See supra notes 10-55 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 242.
244. Id.
245. Id
246. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 219-28 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The resistance requirement evolved early in common law and was
codified in the Model Penal Code and in the California rape statute.
This requirement, however, should be eliminated from the law of rape
because the standard does not reflect the reality of rape situations. The
majority of victims do not resist their assailants and victim resistance
encourages more violent assaults.
The attempts of two jurisdictions to eliminate the resistance re-
quirement from their rape laws have been largely ineffective. The Cali-
fornia Levine Bill inadvertently adopts the language of common law
rape in redefining the crime, and may thus require more resistance on
the part of victims than did the old California rape statute. The Michi-
gan "criminal circumstances" test should be rejected because its rigid
definition will lead to certain rapes "falling between the cracks" of the
statute's definitions, and going unpunished for that reason.
The proposed model statute is clear, concise and explicit. It will
eliminate the resistance requirement from the law of rape, and will in-
stead define rape in terms that are relevant and nonprejudicial, by rec-
ognizing that rape is an act of intercourse performed without one
party's consent.
APPENDIX "A"
FORCIBLE RAPE
Definitions
Consent: Consent is the freely given assent to an act of intercourse.
Resistance is not required as a means of showing non-
consent.
Forcible rape is the act of sexual intercourse committed under the fol-
lowing circumstances:
Where a reasonable person, were he or she in the victim's
place, would not have consented to the act of intercourse, in
the light of the perpetrator's actions and all of the surround-
ing circumstances. A victim need not resist his or her assail-
ant under this statute.
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APPENDIX "C"
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2899
Introduced by Assemblyman Levine
March 6, 1980
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
An act to amend Sections 261 and 262 of the Penal Code, relat-
ing to rape.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 2899, as introduced, Levine (Crim.J.). Rape.
Existing law provides two definitions of rape. First, rape is
defined as an act of sexual intercourse accomplished under any of
specified circumstances with a person not the spouse of the perpe-
trator. Second, rape is defined to include an act of sexual inter-
course with the spouse of the perpetrator accomplished under
force, violence or specified threat. Under either definition the use
of force must overcome resistance, or threats must be used to pre-
vent resistance.
This bill would delete the element of resistance and provide
for rape accomplished against the will by force or fear.
Under existing law, Sections 2231 and 2234 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code require the state to reimburse local agencies
and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state.
Other provisions require the Department of Finance to review
statutes disclaiming these costs and provide in certain cases, for
making claims to the State Board of Control for reimbursement.
These statutory provisions will be supplemented by a constitu-
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tional requirement of reimbursement effective for statutes en-
acted on or after July 1, 1980.
AB 2899 -2-
This bill provides that no appropriation is made and no re-
imbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program: yes.
Thepeople of the State of California do enact as follows."
1 SECTION 1. Section 261 of the Penal Code is
2 amended to read:
3 261. Rape is an act of sexual intercourse,
4 accomplished with a person not the spouse of the
5 perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:
6 1. Where a person is incapable, through lunacy or
7 other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or
8 permanent, of giving legal consent;
9 2. Where a person resists, but the person's resistance
10 is overcome by f" rce or violene;
11 3. her , a person is prevented fr.m resisting by
12 threats of great and immediate bodily harm;..
13 A a .... by apparent p wer f exectin. Where it is
14 accomplished against a person's will by means of force or
15 fear, or by any intoxicating, narcotic, or anaesthetic
16 substance, administered by or with the privity of the
17 accused;
18 4-
19 3. Where a person is at the time unconscious of the
20 nature of the act, and this is known to the accused;
21 -.
22 4. Where a person submits under the belief that the
23 person committing the act is the victim's spouse, and this
24 belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or
25 concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to
26 induce such belief.
27 SEC. 2. Section 262 of the Penal Code is amended to
28 read:
29 262. (a) Rape of a person who is the spouse of a
30 perpetrator is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
1983]
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31 undfr either of the following e .umstaines;.L against the
32 will of
33 (-) Whefe a spouse resists, but the sp...se's r .sistan.
-3- AB 2899
1 s ...... m. by means of force orfear vi,1e..ee.
2 (2) Wher the spouse is pr ovonted fream rsisting by
3 threats of great and immediate bodily harm,
4 accompanied by apparent power of execution.
5 (b) The provisions of Section 800 shall apply to this
6 section; however, there shall be no arrest or prosecution
7 under this section unless the violation of this section is
8 reported to a peace officer having the power to arrest for
9 a violation of this section or to the district attorney of the
10 county in which the violation occurred within 30 days
11 after the day of the violation.
12 SEC. 3. No appropriation is made by this act pursuant
13 to Section 2231 or 2234 of the Revenue and Taxation Code
14 or Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
15 Constitution because the only costs which may be
16 incurred by a local agency or school district will be
17 because this act creates a new crime or infraction,
18 changes the definition of a crime or infraction, or
19 eliminates a crime or infraction. Furthermore, this act
20 does not create any present or future obligation to
21 reimburse any local agency or school district for any costs
22 incurred because of this act.
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